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FRAUKE BERNDT
The Myth of Otherness: Goethe on Presence
WESTERN CULTURE IS DOMINATED by representation—however, in 1993 in a series of essays, Jean-Luc Nancy counters this paradigm of all sig-
nification processes from a culturally critical perspective with a new para-
digm, and proclaims “the birth to presence.”1 In the course of this paradigm 
shift from representation to presence and as a consequence of Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht’s work, contemporary literary criticism has also taken an interest 
in “what meaning cannot convey.”2 Yet, to speak of a “new” paradigm implies a 
kind of mastery, since presence basically represents an outdated paradigm in 
two respects.  In the hermeneutic tradition, whose roots are deeply grounded 
in the philosophical aesthetic of the nineteenth century, the concept was, 
first, used for the direct experience of meaning, most importantly in the 
realm of art. Second, as understood by poststructuralist thinkers—especially 
in the field of deconstruction—hermeneutics was then seen to be motivated 
by a disproportionate or even false desire for presence. Since the 1960s, in 
the wake of these investigation into representation, the paradigm fell into 
oblivion or even disrepute. Hermeneutics seemed to be a mode of engaging 
with texts that sought to secure the full presence of signification, a pleroma 
of meaning.  In contrast, the emphasis among poststructuralists was on the 
dark stain of the signifier, the operation of the trope, the play of textual signs 
deferring any arrival at a fullness of meaning.
If, in the age of post-hermeneutics,3 presence is now invoked as a coun-
terforce to hermeneutics, there seems to be a peculiar anti-deconstructive 
twist at work in much of this new thinking.  To the extent that the return to 
presence employs a concept that deconstruction has deemed obsolete, the 
new focus on presence entails neither a turn nor a return leading into the 
past.  Instead, this return opens up a future potential without requiring or 
anticipating any dialectical reconciliation in the synthesis of hermeneutics 
and deconstruction.  The new paradigm is not only outdated in two respects, 
but the return to presence is in two respects also a defensive gesture. On 
one hand, this gesture is directed at hermeneutics, which, at the expense of 
meaning, excludes everything that cannot be converted into meaning. On 
the other hand, the defense is directed against the poststructuralist interpre-
tative practice of deconstruction, which in itself is not less obsessed with 
meaning.  In order for the unlimited semiosis process to unfold smoothly, 
deconstruction also has to exclude all other material aspects of such proc-
esses that then become the focus of attention with the return to presence: I 
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would like to call this phenomenon, which has been integrated into the theo-
retical settings of various disciplines since the turn of the century, “the other 
of meaning.” With this in mind, and considering the broader context of the 
material turn, cultural theory puts a fundamentally new orientation related to 
the history of ideas on its agenda alongside the new paradigm which already 
integrates considerable research.
In the new discourse of presence, then, the deferral and difference to 
which poststructuralists have drawn their attention become the very site of 
an encounter with presence as radical otherness. Presence cannot be the-
matized or converted into what is familiar—“semblable”—and it is located 
not so much in the “thickness” of the sign, but rather in a semiotic and sen-
sual surplus that inheres in aesthetic and ethical experience.  This new form 
of attentiveness plays out against the backdrop of twentieth-century theory, 
established above all by Martin Heidegger, and calls upon the entire retinue 
of philosophers, psychoanalysts, and cultural theorists from Jacques Lacan to 
Emmanuel Lévinas.  In particular, Dieter Mersch has integrated this semiotic 
approach and thereby has set an important cornerstone for the revision of 
the new paradigm in aesthetics and ethics: in the poststructuralist tradition, 
his considerations are based on the negativity of the sign. Signs are, in short, 
neither what they stand for, what they clarify, present, or identify, nor are they 
that with which the signata demarcate or differentiate themselves from one 
another.  The reverse side of this negativity is the affirmation of phenomenal 
individuality that comes into view with the object.  It is not the object of 
reference—of the signified—but rather the reality of the sign itself, whose 
specific materiality or mediality Mersch interprets as an “occurrence” or a 
“performative mediality.” It “can console, can hurt or wound and has the force 
of intervention simply because of the fact ‘that’” it exists.4
In contrast, my interest in “the other of meaning” is less focused on cur-
rent theories than on historical ones, of which the return to presence is to a 
certain extent reminiscent when it establishes a new paradigm. My consid-
erations here go back to Martin Seel’s groundbreaking revision of modern 
aesthetics since 1750. Seel does not start
with concepts of being-so [Sosein] or semblance [Schein] but with a concept 
of appearing [Erscheinen].  The appearing of which we shall be speaking is a 
reality that all aesthetic objects share, however different they may otherwise 
be.  It plays its part everywhere in the aesthetic realm, in all aesthetic activity.5
In a sense Seel wishes to go back to the future, which means locating the 
aesthetic paradigm from the time in which it originated around 1800—long 
before hermeneutics could misuse it and deconstruction could disdain 
it.  Who would have thought that the Urszene of presence—which I locate 
in the staging of the symbol in Goethe’s famous letter to Schiller from the 
16th and 17th of August 1797—would figure in the discursive environment 
of classical aesthetics in the late eighteenth century? And who would have 
thought, either, that of all things, the concept of the symbol, so highly debat-
ed between hermeneutics and deconstruction, would form the origin of the 
discourse of presence in its basic psychological, metaphysical, and ethical 
complexity? Over the course of this paper, I would like to reconstruct three 
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aspects that fundamentally underpin this topic’s historical perspective: first, 
the criticism of the symbol in relation to Goethe’s letter; second, the confron-
tation with “the other of meaning” in perception (the psychology of pres-
ence); third, the negotiation of the other in (re-)presentation (the metaphys-
ics of presence); and fourth, the acknowledgment of the other in transmis-
sion (the ethics of presence).
I.
To be sure, we all still remember the death blow Paul de Man delivered in 
The Rhetoric of Temporality, in which the symbol is the main target of his 
deconstruction of the suspicious figure of self-presence:
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identifica-
tion, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, 
renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language 
in the void of this temporal difference.  In so doing, it prevents the self from an 
illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, 
recognized as a non-self.6
In his structuralistic analysis of the symbol of Goethe’s time, Michael 
Titzmann in particular developed similar aporias.  In conjunction with de 
Man, but also Tzvetan Todorov, Titzmann assumes though7 that the sym-
bol is actually not an art historical concept, but rather an epistemological 
one, rooted in aesthetics as the science of the sensual as a form of non-
conceptual knowledge, in the manner that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 
established in 1750 and 1758 in the Aesthetica.  It was only in the course of 
the nineteenth century that it was restricted to art discourse (Kunstsymbol/
Anschauungssymbol).  Thus, a symbol is always concerned with a specific 
structure of meaning, about which Titzmann emphasizes two aspects: First, 
the metaphysical exclusivity of meaning given that the symbol does not 
represent a universality or an idea, but rather the universal and the idea. 
Second,  Titzman refers to the logical paradox of representation.  A symbol 
is thus concerned with a semiotic variable that cannot exist in reality.8 This 
paradoxical structure returns to the physical presence, which overlaps with 
the symbol’s function as a representation, causing the paradigm of represen-
tation to reach the limits of its capabilities in symbol theories.  The symbol 
represents only as long as it is present.
Nevertheless, it was Hans-Georg Gadamer who, in Wahrheit und Methode, 
recognized the relation between the suspicious symbol and the discourse of 
presence, and, in contrast to all the other symbol critics, assessed it as not 
only positive, but also as constitutive:
Ob es religiöses Symbol ist oder in profanem Sinne auftritt, als ein Abzeichen 
oder ein Ausweis oder ein Losungswort—in jedem Falle beruht die Bedeutung 
des Symbolon auf seiner Präsenz und gewinnt durch die Gegenwart seines 
Gezeigt- oder Gesagtwerdens erst seine repräsentierende Funktion.9
The debate about the implications of Gadamer’s argument which has pri-
marily taken place in research on the Goethe era at the highest levels for 
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decades cannot be pursued here; however, one point is clear with regard to 
this essay’s question: thinking outside the deconstructive box, the new para-
digm, which posits presence as an occasion of radical de-centering and dis-
possession by otherness, actually appears closely related both to the aesthet-
ic paradigm of the period around 1800 in general, and to the concept of the 
symbol in particular. Hence, the symbol turns out to be a far less ideological 
entity than had hitherto been assumed.  As a matter of fact, no other aesthetic 
concept has proven as rich, as fertile, and as protean as that of the symbol.  At 
the same time, however, no other concept seems more difficult to define 
and to contain, both in terms of its practical applications and in terms of its 
precise meaning.  This may actually be a good thing, for the symbol is not so 
much a concept as a problem—that is, in the best sense of the Greek term 
proble¯ma, something which is presented.  As such, the symbol also becomes 
the site of debates about a truly exciting experience—the experience of oth-
erness.  The concept of the symbol cannot, of course, encapsulate the experi-
ence of presence, the complexity of which invariably eludes its simple logic. 
Strictly speaking, we cannot talk about presence at all; instead, we are merely 
able to point or refer to it.
It is thus not surprising that the first aesthetic theory of presence did not 
appear in the guise of a scholarly treatise. Rather, Goethe chose the narrative 
form of myth to put into words his experience of 1797, when he encoun-
tered, for the first time in the history of modern aesthetics, “the other of 
meaning”—an other that breaks through, shatters, overwhelms, and exceeds 
the hermeneutic enterprise, the always unfinished labor of unfolding the 
meaning of things against the backdrop of cultural and historical contexts.  It 
is this non-conceptual mode of literary staging that makes Goethe’s letter 
to Schiller the most important evidence for the thesis that the discourse of 
presence is historically based in the discourse of the symbol and vice versa: 
that the symbol is the pivot of the paradigm shift from representation to 
presence.
In her reading of Goethe’s letter, Barbara Naumann was the first to point 
to its central relevance for the theory of the non-conceptual mode of cogni-
tion. Naumann developed her interpretation between Gadamer’s thesis that 
Goethe’s letter about the symbol was not concerned with aesthetical but rath-
er with empirical experience (Wirklichkeitserfahrung) and Ernst Cassirer’s 
thesis that Goethe fosters a scientific concept of the symbol in his letter (präg-
nanter Moment), because he integrates empirical experimentation, sensory 
perception, and logical sequences against this background, Naumann empha-
sizes the critically substantiated train of the letter, which, as was the case with 
Immanuel Kant, was concerned with the possibilities of knowledge. She goes 
on to say that where the symbolic emerges, it produces both an intellectual as 
well as aesthetical surplus value that is, however, a surplus value of meaning in 
the empirical horizon.10 The materiality of the empirical that stands to be dis-
cussed in the paradigm shift from representation to presence in the meantime 
does not play a role for Naumann; her reading of the letter thus confirms the 
domination of representation around 1800.
Rüdiger Campe’s interpretation of the letter comes to the same findings. 
On the one hand, he also turns away from art discourse on the symbol. On 
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the other hand, Campe remains obligated to the paradigm of representa-
tion, although he now poses a second concept in addition to meaningful 
(bedeutend)—the concept of merkwürdig,11 which he understands in the 
sense of “notable.” Campe’s theory of meaning is therefore based on the nota-
tional system of sequences that Goethe put to the test in his letter based on 
statistical and cartographic techniques.  Accordingly, it is the transcendental 
structure of these objects that is symbolic, not the objects or the relationship 
between the objects and meaning.  It forms the formal matrix for the notable 
data that precede these individual notations and through which they arise.  If 
this notational system is successful, then the symbolic whole appears quasi 
in an image before one’s eyes.12
My own close reading of this letter picks up exactly at this point of the 
relationship between bedeutend and merkwürdig.  In contrast to Campe, 
though, I reserve the term merkwürdig for something that cannot be easily 
paraphrased, but rather to some extent tentatively points or refers to “the 
other of meaning.” In the following I will show how this “other of meaning” 
becomes more distinct in the tension between sensuality and reason and in 
doing so combines the meaning as well as its other cautiously with the para-
digm of presence and representation. My reading does not capitalize on the 
terms that Goethe employed but rather on his enactment of the myth—the 
myth of otherness.
II.
In his letter to Schiller of 16/17 August 1797, written during the most fever-
ish and fertile phase of Goethe’s theoretical engagement with the symbol 
in his scientific and poetological works, he related to his friend and fellow 
thinker Schiller an experience he had during one of his recent travels. His 
journey had not taken him to Rome or to some other place of cultural inter-
est, but to his own hometown of Frankfurt, where two things attracted his 
particular attention. One of these was the place Goethe stayed during his 
visit, a place “der in Absicht seiner Lage und alles dessen was darauf vor-
geht in einem jeden Momente symbolisch ist.”13 This place is, of course, the 
house on the Rossmarkt, which had been owned by Goethe’s mother since 
1795.  The other notable location is the site of his grandfather’s house, its 
courtyard and its garden.  This site had developed into a thriving marketplace 
before it was destroyed in July 1796 during a French bombardment. Yet it 
would subsequently serve as the stage for Goethe’s enactment of a myth, 
and one is almost tempted to read this choice of setting as a clever pun on 
Goethe’s part. Etymologically speaking, the marketplace hints at the concept 
of allegory.  The term “allegory” derives from the Greek allos agoreuein and 
literally translates as “speaking otherwise” or, more precisely, “speaking other 
than in the public sphere of the marketplace,” that is, in the agora.14 This, of 
course, means the presence of the very model that had regulated the herme-
neutic enterprise until the end of the eighteenth century—the very model 
against which Goethe now brings in the big gun of the symbol.
And yet at first, even Goethe himself is not so much interested in the 
experience of presence as in the complex meaning of the kind of symbol 
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that the Frankfurt marketplace represents.  In the same year in which he 
wrote the letter to Schiller, Goethe commented on this topic in his essay on 
the visual arts: “Die auf diese Weise dargestellten Gegenstände scheinen bloß 
für sich zu stehen und sind doch wieder im Tiefsten bedeutend.”15 Naumann 
thus rightly states that, in most of these reflections, symbol and meaning 
(or rather the meaningful) appear directly linked with one another16—and 
linked in a manner that is largely rooted in Goethe’s well-worn opposition 
between allegory and symbol:
Es ist ein großer Unterschied, ob der Dichter zum Allgemeinen das Besondere 
sucht, oder im Besondern das Allgemeine schaut.  Aus jener Art entsteht 
Allegorie, wo das Besondere nur als Beyspiel, als Exempel des Allgemeinen gilt; 
die letztere aber ist eigentlich die Natur der Poesie; sie spricht ein Besonderes 
aus, ohne ans Allgemeine zu denken, oder darauf hinzuweisen.  Wer nun dieses 
Besondere lebendig faßt, erhält zugleich das Allgemeine mit, ohne es gewahr zu 
werden, oder erst spät.17
As the active apprehension of an object characterized by complex structures 
of meaning, the symbol, unlike allegory, cannot be reduced to a neatly single 
concept; it is thus not an example of something.  The question as to what the 
symbol is, or rather, how such active apprehension of an object actually takes 
place, is a question Goethe’s letter does not just negotiate in the marketplace 
or agora, the site of the ancients’ public debates and candid oratory (par-
rhesia) on their day’s great questions of philosophy and truth. Moreover, the 
marketplace, as Goethe evokes it in his letter to Schiller, shows itself or, even, 
stages the answer to these questions.
As soon as Goethe turns to the subject of such active apprehension prop-
er, however, attention shifts from the meaningful towards the curious quality 
of the symbol—or, as I shall prefer to put it here, from meaning towards the 
other. Goethe’s experience of presence gives the symbol, in the marketplace, 
its first big break on the stage of modern aesthetics.  This debut is rooted in 
a perceptional situation that Goethe describes as the “ruhigen und kalten 
Weg des Beobachtens, ja des bloßen Sehens.”18 This path branches out in 
two directions: in the direction of conceptual cognition on the one hand, 
and in the direction of perceptional cognition on the other.  Initially, Goethe’s 
notion of perceptional cognition, not withstanding his awareness of its logi-
cal unreliability, aims at the conceptual determination of the object.  As he 
explains to Schiller:
[D]as was ich im allgemeinen sehe und erfahre schließt sich recht gut an alles 
übrige an, was mir sonst bekannt ist und ist mir nicht unangenehm, weil es 
in der ganzen Masse meiner Kenntnisse mitzählt, und das Kapital vermehren 
hilft.19
The perceptional condition,20 that is, the sum total of all sensate, perceiv-
able,21 and conceptually distinguishable characteristics of an object, feeds 
into the great archive of what is accepted as true.  In other words, the percep-
tional condition feeds into one’s store of accumulated knowledge.  A different 
perceptional situation occurs for Goethe at the two sites whose very oth-
erness leaves a particularly deep impression on him.  These two sites—and 
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these alone—are, throughout the entire journey, the only objects that evoke 
any sort of sentiment in Goethe and induce in him a poetic disposition.  As 
Goethe writes to Schiller, they do so precisely because they are, in essence, 
symbolic.22
The careful study of this different perceptional situation leads Goethe, 
again in his letter to Schiller, to a definition that aims at achieving a con-
ception of the symbol from the point of view of both the subject and the 
object.  This definition, however, does not link its individual arguments either 
causatively or purposively, but simply strings them together in no particular 
order:
Ich habe daher die Gegenstände, die einen solchen Effekt hervorbringen, genau 
betrachtet und zu meiner Verwunderung bemerkt daß sie eigentlich symbo-
lisch sind. Das heißt, wie ich kaum zu sagen brauche, es sind eminente Fälle, 
die, in einer charakteristischen Mannigfaltigkeit, als Repräsentanten von vielen 
andern dastehen, eine gewisse Totalität in sich schließen, eine gewisse Reihe 
fordern, ähnliches und fremdes in meinem Geiste aufregen und so von außen 
wie von innen an eine gewisse Einheit und Allheit Anspruch machen.23
The definition proper begins before the syntactic insertion that follows the 
relative pronoun: “Symbolische Gegenstände sind eminente Fälle, die. . . .” 
Even before the very first element is listed in the relative clause, this inser-
tion determines the basis on which the symbol is then to be defined: “. . ., die 
in einer charakterischen Mannigfaltigkeit, . . . .”  This insertion indicates that 
along Goethe’s path to the symbol lies the affirmation of the conceptually 
and practically indeterminability of the phenomenon24—the affirmation of 
the object’s phenomenal individuality in its presence.25 Unlike mere sensual 
perception, aesthetic perception does not aim conceptually to discriminate 
this individuality, but rather allows individuality to appear in the first place. 
Unlike the three stages of sensual perception, aesthetic perception is char-
acterized by a unique surplus value. Goethe is not content simply to cognize 
and classify objects, nor does he content himself with an awareness of this 
process of cognition and classification; instead, he deliberately exposes him-
self to an attentiveness towards the phenomenal presence of the object.26 
Only once the course has thus been set does Goethe add the four specific 
elements to his definition: symbols are eminent instances that exhibit, in 
characteristic diversity, features x1, x2, x3, and x4.
III.
Goethe’s letter to Schiller treats both meaning and its other, and it is here 
that Goethe correlates both types of interest in objects—the interest in their 
meaning and the interest in the laws of cognition.  To this end, Goethe, rather 
than opting for concepts, takes recourse to a narrative to relate to Schiller his 
experience of presence in the marketplace.  The process of defining this pres-
ence does not, however, lead him into the typical aporias of the metaphysics 
of presence. Such metaphysics have, as I noted, been subject to ideology-crit-
ical deconstructions by Paul de Man and others.27 Goethe, meanwhile, is not 
concerned with self-presence as such, but rather with the complex dialectics 
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of meaning and its other.  Within his narrative, Goethe notably attributes a 
temporal continuum to the symbol by staging the experience of otherness as 
a path towards meaning.  The story’s point of departure is the fond memory 
of early childhood days spent in the old Frankfurt town house, the pitiful 
remnants of which he now revisits.  This renewed encounter triggers a veri-
table shock and transforms the pile of rubble into an eminent instance, into 
a memorial, or, to put it more accurately, into a mnemonic.  In this state of 
attention, the symbol emerges and indeed persists. Yet, symbols do not have 
a poetic form, as Goethe writes to Schiller, but rather an ideal and thus ulti-
mately human form in the higher sense of the word.  Thus, the emergence of 
a symbol apparently requires more than the workmanlike conceiving of the 
object on the part of the poet.28
Unlike rhetorical figures (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, or allegory), 
the symbol arises from sentiment, the complex economy of which com-
mands considerable respect from the poet. For just as sentiment holds out 
the promise of a higher sort of meaning, it also threatens the feeling subject 
with dangers that Goethe presents in a veritable initiation tableau. On the 
one hand, the feeling subject runs the risk of being caught in the Sisyphean 
task of aesthetic perception, and of feeling compelled conceptually to dis-
criminate and rhetorically to format certain features while clearly lacking 
the capacity to spell out the particular. On the other hand, there is the prob-
lem of perpetually having to conjure up phantoms of every description 
from one’s innermost depths. For this reason Goethe imagines the aesthet-
ic perceptional situation as an ambivalent encounter with the monstrous, 
“millionfache[] Hydra der Empirie,” an inescapably Herculean task, “denn 
wer bei ihr nicht Lust oder Vorteil zu suchen hat der mag sich bei Zeiten 
zurückziehen.”29
What Goethe here stages as the empiricist Hydra’s menacing threat to 
the poet can easily be read as a foundation myth. He who seeks pleasure 
or advantage in the experience of presence does, after all, not only find but 
also found a symbol for his community; by contrast, anyone who does not 
possess the strength of a hero or the necessary humility of an ordinary mor-
tal is apparently in danger of falling prey to madness in narcissistic regres-
sion.  Whoever manages to decapitate the Hydra completely and bring home 
the trophy of the symbol is, consequently, not only a founder of culture, but is 
also allowed to forget the painful path he has traveled to reach this point: the 
original constitution or formation of the symbol.  The fact that Goethe’s myth 
also—and, as it were, almost in passing—supplies the original etymology of 
the term “symbol” nicely rounds off and indeed completes the picture.  The 
Greek roots symballein—to throw together, to unite—as well as symballest-
hai—to bring into accord or agreement materially and intellectually, presup-
pose one thing above all: the act of uniting the two halves of the symbolon 
into a single whole.  At the same time, however, this act also highlights the 
erstwhile separateness of the two halves or, conversely, a fracture or split 
of an erstwhile whole.30 Thus, every symbol makes manifest the structural 
defect inherent in the experience of presence that gives rise to the symbol in 
the first place—even if we can arrest its meaning and make ourselves forget 
the trauma.31
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Schiller, in his reply to Goethe of 7 September 1797, once again takes up 
the concept of sentiment to characterize this profound and literally abys-
mal process of symbolization; here, however, sentiment competes with the 
concept of seeing or intuition, the latter narrowed to its application to the 
historical sense. Schiller contrasts Goethe’s way of observing with another 
mode of cognition:
Es ist ein Bedürfniß poetischer Naturen, wenn man nicht überhaupt 
Menschlicher Gemüther sagen will, so wenig leeres als möglich um sich zu lei-
den, soviel Welt, als nur immer angeht, sich durch die Empfindung anzueignen, 
die Tiefe aller Erscheinungen zu suchen, und überall ein Ganzes der Menschheit 
zu fo[r]dern.32
Both Goethe’s and Schiller’s terminological usage clearly recalls the lega-
cy of eighteenth-century philosophical aesthetics. Conceptual/logical and 
non-conceptual/aesthetic modes of cognition differ from one another quali-
tatively rather than merely in terms of their respective degrees of distinc-
tion.  At the same time, both Goethe and Schiller introduce a medial perspec-
tive on the symbol by linking the concept of sentiment to the notion of 
poetry. Sentiment is supposed to function as an indexical sign and should 
thus denote something.33 This coupling of epistemology and media theo-
ry within the discourse on the symbol makes it impossible to determine 
whether Goethe and Schiller are talking about aesthetic perception or about 
a material medium.  Within the definition of the symbol, the medium pushes 
in front of or covers perception. Particularly in the context of his art-theoret-
ical writings, Goethe repeatedly emphasizes the materiality of the symbol, as 
evidenced by his use of both the rhetorical concept of presentation and the 
aesthetic concept of formation. Symbols are thus (re-)presented or formed; 
as formed entities, and in spite of their materiality, they are notably and per 
se “von allem Gemeinen und Individuellen entkleidet.”34 Hence the idealis-
tic compromise for the media-theoretical fact that such (re-)presentations 
can become symbolic.
The idea that objects are not (only) seen but also felt changes the sym-
bolic scene and sets it astir, for (re-)presentation requires a certain order 
or “Reihe.”35 Only through the aesthetic receptiveness to the phenomenal 
simultaneity of the givenness of objects can these objects manifest their 
processuality.  This very processuality, in turn, then bestows on them the 
status of aesthetic objects.36 This, at least, is how Seel perspectivizes aes-
thetic perception, a perception that can only fulfill itself by way of percep-
tual predicates. Predication by predication, judgment by judgment, Goethe 
senses the features of an object, one by one. Sentiment, however, encom-
passes more than these predications, at least insofar as the act of ordering 
also emphasizes the structure that is medially realized as a text, that is, as 
a complex order of paradigmatic and syntagmatic concatenations.37 When 
Goethe replaces the object of aesthetic perception with a story, he thus 
not only takes minutes on perception, as it were, but also tracks the object 
of perception through time.  As aesthetic perception activates the familiar 
and the foreign in Goethe’s mind, time appears on the symbolic scene, and 
the letter to Schiller suddenly turns into a narrative, or rather a legend of 
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progressing capitalism.  The space once occupied by his grandfather’s house, 
its courtyard, and its gardens has been transformed:
[Der Raum wurde] aus dem beschränktesten patriarchalischen Zustande, 
in welchem ein alter Schultheiß von Frankfurth lebte, durch klug unterneh-
mende Menschen zum nützlichsten Waren und Marktplatz verändert [. . .]. Die 
Anstalt ging durch sonderbare Zufälle bei dem Bombardement zu Grunde und 
ist jetzt, größtenteils als Schutthaufen, noch immer das doppelte dessen wert 
was vor 11 Jahren von den gegenwärtigen Besitzern an die Meinigen bezahlt 
worden.  In so fern sich nun denken läßt daß das Ganze wieder von einem 
neuen Unternehmer gekauft und hergestellt werde, so sehn Sie leicht daß es, in 
mehr als Einem Sinne, als Symbol vieler tausend andern Fälle, in dieser gewerb-
reichen Stadt, besonders vor meinem Anschauen, dastehen muß.38
Goethe adds synchronic links to the diachronic links that emerge as a result 
of the fact that the object not only has changed over time but will contin-
ue to change in the future. Due to relationships of similarity (the familiar) 
as well as to relationships of contiguity (the foreign), these concatenations 
contribute to the diversity of the object.  As far as aesthetic perception is 
concerned, Goethe thus presupposes not only a comprehensive contextual 
knowledge—a local knowledge, as it were—but also, and most importantly, a 
hermeneutic operation.  This operation lifts the object above its current per-
ceptional situation, beyond the subject’s individual perceptional perspective, 
and impacts a comparison with other perceptional situations: ultimately, to 
quote Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften, it thus apprehends the object “mit 
seiner Lokalität, mit aller Nachbarschaft.”39 Consequently, it would seem that 
none of these symbolic scenes are repeatable; at the same time, however, 
every such scene must have been repeated in order to have become sym-
bolic in the first place.  Indeed, the scene is based on a curious, even para-
doxical, interplay of presence and absence. For Goethe, the object is at once 
present—in the unique perceptional situation—and absent—in the recapit-
ulation of itself, where Goethe consolidates the remembered perceptional 
situation into a text.40 A repetition of the kind represented by the encounter 
with the places of childhood ought thus not to be read, in the Freudian sense, 
as an unconscious repetition of the repressed; rather, it encompasses both 
the conscious memory of the past and an expectance or anticipation of the 
future.
Goethe, however, is not merely interested in the symbol from an episte-
mological and representational point of view; rather, he also stages the myth 
with the apparent aim of getting closer to the structure’s metaphysical mode 
of being. But even though Goethe grounds his definition of aesthetic per-
ception in the diversity of sensual perception, he has trouble overcoming 
the central epistemological problem inherent in the fact that sentiment, as 
opposed to reason, is regarded as a deficient mode of cognition. However, 
since Goethe supposes the objects’ lack of cognoscibility and, linked to this, 
the renunciation of our desire to fix objects conceptually, to be the very 
prerequisite for objects to become symbolic objects, he ultimately aims at 
a double perspectivization of the aesthetic perceptional situation. On the 
one hand, aesthetic perception lays claim, both internally and externally, to 
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a certain “Einheit” and “Allheit”; on the other hand, it encompasses a certain 
“Totalität.” “Einheit” and “Allheit” at first function as complementary concepts 
in the regulation of aesthetic perception.  Thus, the following rule of thumb 
would seem to apply: no unity, no perception; no allness, no aesthetics. 
Ultimately, however, it is precisely the interplay of the conceptual (unity) and 
the aconceptual (allness) that enables the symbolic object to emerge.
Interior unity, one could thus argue, regulates the interior concatenations 
of aesthetic perception—that is,  all its forms of order, from the spatial and 
temporal configurations of its individual elements to the disposition that 
engenders the simultaneously autobiographic and historiographic narrative 
into which Goethe translates the aesthetic experience. Correspondingly, 
exterior unity regulates the external concatenations of aesthetic percep-
tion.  It delimits the symbolic object from other objects of perception, while 
allness focuses on the state of play that keeps the object’s phenomenological 
plenitude in abeyance.41 Given this premise, interior allness points to the 
fundamentally open and open-ended process of aesthetic perception. Clearly 
echoing Immanuel Kant, such interior allness corresponds to the aesthetic 
idea: “diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veran-
laßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. Begriff adäquat 
sein kann, die folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen 
kann.”42 Conversely, exterior allness pertains to the diverse concatena-
tions that connect the object with the familiar and the foreign in aesthetic 
perception.
Both allness and unity, however, express the age-old metaphysical prin-
ciples that different disciplines define, respectively, in terms of cosmology, 
ontology, or theology.  At this point, if not before, Goethe’s chosen path of 
observation finally loses its immanence. Here,  at last, Goethe lets the meta-
physical cat out of the empirical bag.  As a result, the symbolic stage acquires 
a metaphysical backdrop in addition to its epistemological and represen-
tational mise-en-scène.  As Kant writes: “So ist die Allheit (Totalität) nicht 
anders als die Vielheit als Einheit betrachtet.”43 Goethe, however, not only 
emphasizes the quantitative aspect of subjective sentiment in relation to the 
symbol, but, significantly,  also stresses the symbol’s objective totality—not 
an absolute totality, but nevertheless a totality.  This totality pertains, on the 
one hand and in terms of the object, to the completeness, now conceived 
as perfection, of the symbolic object; on the other hand,  and in terms of 
the subject, it relates to the process of aesthetic perception.  As a detractor 
of mere lists, however, Goethe questions whether the object, or indeed the 
process of aesthetic perception, can ever attain totality—an attitude that cor-
responds to the symbol’s inherent structural deficiency. Goethe’s conception 
of the symbol thus holds out the prospect of replacing the old metaphysical 
notion of totality with a new, libidinal-economic notion of taking pleasure in 
playfulness.
IV.
As we have seen, Goethe stages the logical, psychological, poetological, rhe-
torical, and metaphysical aspects of the symbol within a force-field defined 
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by the poles of meaning and its other.  Within this scheme of things, the phe-
nomenological appearance of the other complicates the transmission of 
meaning to a degree that would carry much less weight were the material-
medial surplus value of the symbol not fed into the circulatory system of 
cultural data streams.  According to Naumann’s pointed reading of the situ-
ation in which the letter is transmitted, the symbolic, where it does occur, 
produces precisely the kind of intellectual surplus value that may also be an 
aesthetic one.  At the same time, however, it is also, and above all, a surplus 
value of meaning.44
Goethe explores transmission in several directions, namely as medial, 
iterative, and communicative transmission.  The first of these—medial trans-
mission—concerns the transmission or transfer of an idea to an object.  In 
this process, the symbolic object lends form to the idea and thus becomes 
its material signifier.  The catalyst for this transfer is the said general-human, 
which is regulated by the hermeneutics of the symbol and, as Titzmann 
emphasizes in a decidedly ideology-critical vein, ties both the symbol’s 
hermeneutics and its pragmatics to the ideologemes of culture.45 Symbols 
are supposed to embody culture’s highest values; hence, norms and ideolog-
ical deflections are not permissible in this scheme of things.  Interestingly, 
Goethe calls for just such a sensus communis in the symbol when he writes 
to Schiller:
Symbolische Gegenstände sind also, was ein glückliches Sujet dem Dichter 
ist, glückliche Gegenstände für den Menschen und weil man, indem man 
sie mit sich selbst rekapituliert, ihnen keine poetische Form geben kann, 
so muß man ihnen doch eine ideale geben, eine menschliche im höhern 
Sinn, das [man] auch mit einem so sehr mißbrauchten Ausdruck sentimental 
nannte.46
Schiller, a card-carrying Kantian, promptly seizes upon the scene of transmis-
sion as an opportunity to deflect Goethe’s interest from the sensual pres-
ence of the aesthetic object and to direct him instead towards the symbolic 
activity of the subject.  In his reply to Goethe, Schiller invokes a compelling 
argument from symbol criticism, which never fails to hit the mark once the 
symbol is meant to denote a predicated absolute such as God, nature, man, 
beauty, ethicality, or moral excellence.  Any symbol can, after all, only mean 
one thing; it can only ever denote the one absolute:
Was Ihnen die zwey angeführten Plätze gewesen sind, würde Ihnen unter 
andern Umständen, bei einer mehr aufgeschloßenen poetischen Stimmung jede 
Strasse, Brücke, jedes Schiff, ein Pflug oder irgendein anderes mechanisches 
Werkzeug vielleicht geleistet haben.47
The conceptual cluster of “human-ideal-sentimental” must seem to Schiller 
like a more than friendly nod in his direction, and the notion of transmis-
sion does indeed seem to occasion Goethe to revise the symbol’s alignment 
with phenomenal individuality. Ultimately, however, Goethe sticks with 
the concept of mediality, and the materiality of the symbol fundamentally 
underpins his experience of presence.  What thus matters to Goethe is not 
so much the human topics that both the producer and the recipient of the 
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symbol have at their common disposal, but rather the fact that the symbol, 
in spite of its denotative function, needs to be distinguished from the ordi-
nary sign; the latter spends itself completely in the transmission of mean-
ing, while the former always leaves, so to speak, a material residue in its 
otherness:
Wann ist eine sentimentale Erscheinung (die wir nicht verachten dürfen wenn 
sie auch noch so lästig ist) unerträglich? ich antworte wenn das Ideale unmit-
telbar mit dem gemeinen verbunden wird, es kann dies nur durch eine leere, 
gehalt- und formlose Manier geschehen, denn beide werden dadurch vernich-
tet, die Idee und der Gegenstand, jene die nur bedeutend sein und sich nur mit 
dem bedeutenden beschäftigen kann, und dieser, der recht wacker brav und 
gut sein kann ohne bedeutend zu sein.48
While the first transmission links the idea to the object, the second, itera-
tive transmission is a situational occurrence.  This transmission is based on 
the repetition or habitualization of the other mode of perception and repre-
sents a polarization or accentuation of the subject’s attention. Only because 
Goethe is able to switch from sensual perception to aesthetic perception at 
any given moment, and only because he is able to transfer the image of the 
Frankfurt marketplace to any other situation he may care to choose, does the 
symbol “marketplace” take shape in the first place:
Ich will es erst noch hier versuchen was ich symbolisches bemerken kann, 
besonders aber an fremden Orten, die ich zum erstenmal sehe, mich üben. 
Gelänge das, so müßte man, ohne die Erfahrung in die Breite verfolgen zu 
wollen, doch, wenn man auf jedem Platz, in jedem Moment, so weit es einem 
vergönnt wäre, in die Tiefe ginge, noch immer genug Beute aus bekannten 
Ländern und Gegenden davon tragen.49
This, in effect, amounts to a remarkable modification of the experience of 
presence: its singular immediacy here gives way to the notion of neces-
sary repetition—a repetition by virtue of which otherness can no longer be 
viewed emphatically as an event, but rather receives a basis in logic and in 
scientific experiment.  In 1798 Goethe sent Schiller the essay, Der Versuch 
als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, in which he describes such an 
arrangement:
Wenn wir die Erfahrungen, welche vor uns gemacht worden, die wir selbst 
oder andere zu gleicher Zeit mit uns machen, vorsätzlich wiederholen und 
die Phänomene die teils zufällig teils künstlich entstanden sind, wieder dar-
stellen, so nennen wir dieses einen Versuch. . . .  Aber eben zwei Versuche die 
mit einander einige Ähnlichkeit haben zu vereinigen und zu verbinden, gehört 
mehr Strenge und Aufmerksamkeit, als selbst scharfe Beobachter oft von sich 
gefordert haben.50
Experimental experience needs to be repeatable in a sequence (Reihe) of 
at least two experiments in order to be proven true—a repeatability already 
emphasized by Goethe in the letter. Only in this sequential process do the 
isolated phenomena gain coherence: “Ein Phänomen, ein Versuch kann  nichts 
beweisen, es ist das Glied einer großen Kette, das erst im Zusammenhange 
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gilt.”51 Thus, repetition transforms experimental experience into symbolical 
cognition:
Es steht als denn einem jeden frei, sie nach seiner Art zu verbinden und ein 
Ganzes daraus zu bilden, das der menschlichen Vorstellungsart überhaupt mehr 
oder weniger bequem und angenehm sei.52
Apparently, this very scientific modification disappoints Goethe in his let-
ter, as it is testimony to a discrete aggressiveness inherent in the symbol as 
Goethe conceives of it. Such discrete aggressiveness, incidentally, also con-
firms once again the heuristic surplus value that the literary staging of the 
problem of the symbol generates over and above any philosophical struggle 
for conceptual clarity.  What is more, this aggressiveness breaks fresh ground 
in the above analyzed initiation topics, which the Herculean myth located 
in Frankfurt draws on again and again.  If Goethe thus imagines penetrating 
to depths from which to haul up the symbol to the light of day, this spatial 
imagery points to the chthonic motherliness that describes the space where 
the founder of culture has to meet his various challenges.  If we follow this 
line of thought, symbolic objects do indeed appear easy quarry—possibly 
even easy female quarry, as good as colonized by Goethe in a quite remark-
able operation of determining the symbolic object’s origins: notably, he loots 
familiar lands and regions for the trophy of his victory.
The third, communicative transmission finally projects the paradigmatic 
axis of the first two transmissions onto a syntagmatic axis, for the two places 
of childhood only become symbolic objects by virtue of the fact that Goethe 
communicates their recapitulation to Schiller.  While reflection thus consti-
tutes the precondition of otherness, the act of address becomes the precondi-
tion of meaning.  Without this transmission from one human being to another, 
there would be no common human being that could keep the transmission 
from object to idea going.  Johann Gottfried Herder succinctly sums up this 
double relationship of the symbol’s presupposition of an acknowledgment 
both of and by the other.  In his Kalligone, his critique of Kant’s Kritik der 
Urteilskraft published in 1800, he writes: “Im Symbol muß entweder durch 
natürliche oder durch eingesetzte Bedeutung, Jeder, für den das Symbol ist, 
den dadurch bedeuteten Begriff anerkennen.”53 As general communication 
media, symbols thus constitute, on the one hand, the respective positions 
(and identities) of ego and alter; on the other hand, they institutionalize the 
meaning of symbols agreed on by these two.
Thus between Kant, Schiller, and Herder an ethical field opens up that links 
the relevance and the stakes of a debate about the pre-conceptual around 
1800 to the renewed interest in presence today. Up until the present, research 
has assumed that the “nature” in the theory of meaning from Goethe’s time 
guaranteed both the universality as well as the ethical motivation of symbols 
(Natursymbole).  Whereas allegory is everything “cultural,” the symbol has to 
be everything “natural.” Symbolic production and reception act according to 
the imperative: Where there is culture, there should be nature! The ontologi-
cal substantiation goes hand in hand with this, and as a result, their meaning 
of the symbols is bound to their physical presence.  As a natural element of 
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a comprehensive unit, the symbol does not represent something, rather it 
means, because it is an organic part of a meaningful whole, due to its own 
being.  With this participation, semiotic concepts such as presence and evi-
dence of the symbol shift into the center of theory, where symbols are now 
negotiated as parasemiotic signs similar to anti-rhetorical images.
In Kant, Schiller, and Herder, “nature” presupposes an order of being and 
meaning that is natural to cultural convention and representation, so that 
meaning can be present in the symbol.  The same also applies to the ideality 
and humanity of the symbol, which can only be universal, because here too 
“nature” as locus universalis guarantees the ethical validity of the symbol.  In 
the name of “nature,” symbols are anchored to such extent in general human-
ity, that every subject recognizes the same in the symbol as the generally 
human. Natural symbols (Natursymbole) cannot be mere objects of negotia-
tion—and Herder’s critique of Kant is aimed precisely at this; when they are 
they become a lesser form of symbol.
When in his letter Goethe specifies the symbol as a general communica-
tion medium that achieves three things—medial, iterative, and communica-
tive transmission—then he obviously does not anchor the presence of the 
symbol in “nature.” Physical presence rather becomes an impulse.  It triggers 
a series of activities that are necessary for the ideal, the human, and the aes-
thetic ideas to appear so that it can be sensually experienced at all. Unlike 
“nature,” presence does not ensure transmission, rather it only re-stimulates 
it again and again, because the symbol in its otherness withdraws from these 
transmissions.  In other words it withdraws from both its aesthetic as well as 
its ethical definition.  With that, all of the metaphysics of presence stand at phi-
losophy’s disposal.  They have to be replaced with a theory of recognition.
Consequentially, all three kinds of transmission—medial, iterative, and 
communicative transmissions—ultimately transform aesthetic perception 
into a cognitio interrupta.  In the disruption of the relationship in which 
the subject of aesthetic perception conquers the Hydra of empiricism, the 
myth founds both the meaning and the phenomenal emergence of the sym-
bol.  Without transmission, there would be neither meaning nor otherness, 
but rather—and simply enough—indeterminability.  In addition to its tempo-
ral dimension, transmission also localizes the symbol.  It marks the specific 
point in both time and space where the subject, either by its own efforts or 
by outside force, abandons or suspends the confrontation with the object of 
aesthetic perception. Here, said object can emerge as an aesthetic one and 
unfold its complex potential for meaning.  In this context, it is of more than 
mere anecdotal value that Goethe stages the myth of the symbol in, precisely, 
a letter—the medium of transmission par excellence.  With the three kinds of 
transmission Goethe does in fact write a media ethic avant la lettre that has 
considerable consequences for the historical assessment of idealism.
In view of my reconstruction of Goethe’s myth of otherness, it would 
indeed seem eminently appropriate to apply a catch phrase that has come 
to increasing prominence in phenomenological aesthetics over the past ten 
years and to speak, quite literally, of a “return to presence.” In spite of the 
fact that the rather unfortunate reception history of the symbol in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, caught as it was between art-metaphysical 
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discourses and ideological criticism, somewhat obscured the view onto the 
importance of this figure of thought, the symbol does feature as one of the 
central paradigms of presence in modern aesthetics and ethics.  There is vir-
tually no argument put forward in the current debates on presence that does 
not already appear, however briefly, in Goethe’s letter to Schiller—a letter 
that, last but not least, also illustrates that any talk of “the other of meaning” 
ultimately eludes philosophical conceptualizing.  While we are thus unable 
to speak of the other, we are nevertheless able to show it: and we are able 
show it, precisely, in the non-conceptual mode of literary staging exemplified 
by this letter.
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